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During the span of two years,
(6) in the eyes of the United States (US)
Burma has gone from a pariah state – once referred to as “a rogue
state” – to a country that has initiated democratic reforms and
which should be encouraged. The thawing of the relationship between the
two countries was made tangible by Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama’s
historic visits (in November 2011 and December 2012, respectively). How-
ever, the Sino-Burmese relationship is still marred by the economic and
commercial sanctions (7) put in place by the United States in the aftermath
of General Saw Maung’s bloody coup d’État in 1988. This economic and
diplomatic isolation of Burma has encouraged the development of a special
relationship with China. China has constructed roads and pipelines in this
neighbouring country and continues to exploit Burma’s natural resources.
The sudden thaw in diplomatic relations with the US and Europe has com-
pletely transformed Burma’s perspective within a two-year period. How do
the Chinese media perceive US interest in a country that Beijing considers
strategic for its security?
All of the five selected articles comment on the reforms currently taking
place in Burma. All of them question the Burmese and American motivations
that direct this tighter relationship, and what it means for China.
Indeed, the authors describe at length the strategic importance that
Burma holds for China. It is first and foremost a “bridge,” explains Li Yibo,
between China and the Indian Ocean, a geographical link that would allow
Beijing to resolve the “Malacca dilemma” (8) (maliujia kunju 马六甲困局), of
which the authors are well aware. Beijing is building a pipeline between Yun-
nan and the port city of Kyaukpyu in hopes of one day carrying fuel im-
ported from Africa and the Middle East. With no expense spared, China is
also renovating the mythical “Burmese route” (Mandalay-Kunming), which
following its use in the transport of American weapons for the Kuomintang
during World War II could become the most prominent canal of Sino-
Burmese trade. Burma’s natural resources (oil, copper, hydraulic energy) are
coveted by the Chinese authorities. 
Beyond the strategic interest that Burma represents for China, the five
articles recount the historic relations between the two countries, which
are founded in part, according to Xiao Ke, on a shared history of Japanese
colonialism, common economic interests, and China’s support for Burma
when it was ostracised. For all these reasons, the Sino-Burmese relation-
ship is, for the authors, special and inevitably close. It is worth noting
that the authors do not fail to remark that in both Chinese and Burmese,
this relationship is known by an evocative term: paukphaw (baobo 胞波
in Chinese). (9)
The Burmese agenda: To break free from
economic and commercial sanctions or to
move away from China’s sphere of
influence? 
Each of the authors offers an explanation for the reasons that led
Burmese president Thein Sein to turn towards the United States. Behind
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Analysis by David Péneau based on:
– Li Yibo, “缅甸: 美军在亚太的下一朵 ‘睡莲’” (Is Burma the American Army’s Next Water Lily in Asia?), Huanqiu wang, 7 December 2012.
– Shi Qingren, (1) “美国意图制衡中国在缅甸的影响力” (The United States’ Objective is to Counterbalance Chinese Influence in Burma),
Zhongguo qingnian bao, 4 January 2013.
– Wang Dong, (2) “中国该如何应对缅甸之 ‘变’” (How Should China React to the Current ‘Changes’ in Burma?), Huanqiu wang, 5 Decem-
ber 2012.
– Xiao Ke, (3) “缅甸改革及其前景刍议” (Reflections on the Burmese Revolution and its Perspectives), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 10, 2012.
– Zhou Xinyu, (4) “美国对缅政策调整述评” (Comments on the Shift of the United States’ Policy in Burma), Xiandai guoji guanxi, No. 2, 2012.
1. Shi Qingren is a researcher at the Centre of Research for National Defence Policy of the Academy
of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army (the PLA’s most influential think-tank).
2. China Youth Daily is the official journal of the Communist Youth League of China.
3. Wang Dong has a degree in foreign policy from China East Normal University.
4. Xiao Ke is an associate professor at China North-East Normal University (School of Politics and
Law). His research is in fundamental theory of political science.
5. Zhou Xinyu is a professor at the School of Foreign Languages in Beijing (School of International
Relations and Diplomacy). His research areas notably include American foreign policy, China’s ris-
ing power, and Chinese public diplomacy.
6. We may symbolically date the beginning of Burma’s political transition with the liberation of
Aung San Suu Kyi on 13 November 2010. The dissolution of the State Peace and Development
Council and the resignation of General Than Shwe on 30 March 2011 signalled the end of the
junta, which has given way to the elected civil government of President Thein Sein. The latter
launched several reforms towards a democratisation of the country (easing of censorship, freeing
of political prisoners, etc.).
7. The United States, the European Union, Australia, and Canada put in place widespread sanctions
against Burma after 1988: forbidding imports, embargo on weapons, freezing trade relations and
investments, forbidding visas for certain leaders, and freezing their assets abroad. These sanctions
are gradually being removed following the progress of democratic reforms. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton notably announced the partial lifting of commercial sanctions against Burma in
September 2012.
8. 80% of Chinese oil imports ship through the Strait of Malacca.
9. Baobo (胞波) in Chinese comes directly from the Burmese word paukphaw, which refers to a very
close relationship. In Burmese as in Chinese, this term is exclusively used to describe Burma-China
relations.
this flip-flop, there would be purely pragmatic reasons resulting from
Burma’s eagerness to break the economic sanctions that have been
weighing on it since 1988. With the Americans playing a game of carrot
and stick, Zhou  Xinyu explains that the Burmese authorities had no
choice but to reform the regime in the hopes of ending the sanctions.
John Blaxland, an Australian expert on Burma cited by Li Yibo, also ex-
plains that Burma does not wish to develop particularly close ties with
the US but that it only seeks “some breathing room” (huxi kongijan 呼吸
空间). According to Li, China should not worry much about this closer re-
lationship. 
Surprisingly, Li Qingren is the only one to mention the fact that the better
disposition of the Burmese government towards the US could also be the
consequence of China’s “rise” (jueqi 崛起), which has created a certain anx-
iety among its neighbours. According to Li, Burma’s closer relationship with
the US is not explained by economic reasons alone but also by its desire to
acquire some “strategic room to manoeuvre” (zhanlüe huixuanyudi 战略回
旋余地) by multiplying its partners.
Criticism of the failure of “human rights
diplomacy” and of the pragmatic turn taken
by the United States
We find in the articles a strong criticism of the American policy in
Burma. Zhou Xinyu shows that, generally, when the US is in a position of
strength on the international scene, its foreign policy is determined by
arbitrary ideological factors. He gives the example of the two periods
that followed the end of World War II and the end of the Cold War, peri-
ods during which ideology would have strongly influenced American for-
eign policy. This notably includes what Zhou calls “human rights
diplomacy” (renquan waijiao 人权外交). At the end of the 1980s, this
“unilateral and interventionist” (danbianzhuyi, ganshezhuyi 单边主义，
干涉主义) stance notably resulted in American sanctions against Burma.
Conversely, when the international political climate for the US deteri-
orates as it did at the end of the 1970s, American foreign policy seems
to show a much more realistic front that places human rights in the back-
ground. The 2008 economic crisis and an international context less
favourable towards the US could therefore explain the sudden pragmatic
turn in American foreign policy, epitomised by Obama’s “Asian pivot”
strategy of which Burma is a part. For Zhou Xinyu, the Americans have
realised the failure of their “human rights policy,” which only ended up
antagonising the Burmese authorities. It took the US some time to realise
that this failure could turn Burma into a new North Korea and that the
sanctions were depriving them of the important potential offered by this
country. “All the United States could do was to sit and watch the growing
influence of China, India, and other powers from the Southeast Asia
peninsula in Burma.” The United States is now trying to make up for lost
time.
According to Zhou Xinyu, Obama’s policy in Burma is pragmatic as it
is dictated by electoral factors. Obama would have used his foreign policy
success to boost his political credential. 
Xiao  Ke also criticises the purely pragmatic motives of the United
States, which only seeks to democratise (here the term is derogatory)
and to privatise the economy whilst China seeks first and foremost to
settle ethnic conflicts and to encourage the development and economic
stability of Burma. 
The hidden agenda of the United States: 
To contain China’s influence in Burma
The authors agree that one of the main goals of American policy in Burma
is to contain China within its borders and to prevent it from having too
much influence in Burma. But according to Xiao Ke, Burma is only the last
link on the chain of American policy in Southeast Asia. Its short-term ob-
jective is to make the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) into
the “southern ‘guardian’ of China” (Zhongguo nanbu de “shouwangzhe” 中
国南部的 “守望者”) in the same role that central Asia plays to the west of
China and both Japan and South Korea to the east. Here we find again the
age-old fear of being surrounded, characteristic of China’s foreign policy.
Li Yibo’s article clearly illustrates this idea with the metaphor of the pond
and the water lilies. He describes the “silent” (xiaoxiao 消消) proliferation
of American military bases in Asia that, even if harbouring a limited number
of soldiers, have at their disposal highly sophisticated and mobile material.
He compares this discreet proliferation to the imperceptible movement of
water lilies expanding on the surface of a pond: all it takes is for the frog to
use these water lilies to jump swiftly on its prey from very far away. As it
happens, wherever one may look around China, from the northeast to the
southeast of Asia and even in the South Pacific, one observes, according
to Li, “a killing machine in disguise” (ancang shaji 暗藏杀机) consisting of
bases placed all around China. The missing link in this machine is Burma,
which would allow the US to connect its bases in South Asia and in ASEAN
countries. (10) Ironically, it is therefore an inverted “String of Pearls” that Li
describes.
For Shi Qingren, this policy led by the United States in Burma “exerts pres-
sure on China’s strategic space” jiya Zhongguo de zhanlüe kongjian 挤压
中国的战略空间), of which Burma is a part. 
The American policy also consists of a worrying dose of soft power that
Zhou Xinyu observes “permeating” (shentou 渗透) Burmese society. This
soft power, according to Li Yibo, potentially includes military links between
the two countries. The invitation extended to Burma to observe the Golden
Cobra military exercise between the US and Thailand is a token of this. For
Li, the prospect of a military alliance between Burma and the US should
worry China, because it would shut down the Burmese solution to the
Malacca dilemma.
What prospects for the Sino-Burmese
relationship? 
As regards the future posture of Burma, Li Yibo explains that the example
of Vietnam, a country that has succeeded in overcoming a historic animosity
towards the United States, proves that the 20 years of bad relations be-
tween Burma and the US will not be enough to thwart this rapprochement.
Burma will have to choose a strategy amongst the many models in South-
east Asia: Thailand’s neutrality, Vietnam’s position (pro-American and aiming
to contain China), the Philippines’ alliance with the US, or Cambodia’s align-
ment policy with China.
Amongst all this criticism towards American policy in Burma, Wang Dong
adopts an original position. Whilst acknowledging the US’s pragmatic policy
and its willingness to contain China, Wong laments an excessively regi-
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10. The American base in South Asia that Li refers to is no doubt that of Diego Garcia in the Chagos
Islands, south of the Maldives.
mented Chinese diplomacy in Burma. He notes three keys to improving the
Sino-Burmese relationships. First and foremost, Chinese “soft power” (ru-
anshili 软实力) in Burma should be accentuated. It entails sustained lobby-
ing for the removal of sanctions on Burma but also support for educational
programs, microcredit schemes, aid for development…. Li Yibo for his part
also speaks of a policy to “win the hearts of Burmese people” (yingde mian-
dian renmin de xin 赢得缅甸人民的心). Wang Dong further explains that
China must not limit its contacts to the Burmese authorities but should
also extend a hand to ethnic minorities and civil society as a whole. Last
but not least, Wang notes that if Chinese investment in Burma is to be ben-
eficial, Chinese companies must assume “greater social responsibility”
(gengda de shehui zeren 更大的社会责任). Wang Dong openly refers to the
social conflicts recently sparked by the construction of the Myitsone dam
and exploitation of a copper mine in Sagaing Province. From a Chinese
media source, this recommendation is thoroughly original.
Shi Qingren’s article is optimistic: he notes that however damaging the
US presence, Sino-Burmese relations are too well anchored for the US to
shake completely. However, and perhaps we could draw here a parallel with
Wang Dong’s recommendations, the researcher from the Academy of Mil-
itary Sciences concludes with a reminder that China would do well to an-
ticipate upcoming difficulties and “repair (consolidate) the house before the
storm” (weiyuchoumou 未雨绸缪).
z Translated by Kate Waller.
78 c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s •  N o . 2 0 1 3 / 2
Current affairs
